The Status of the Unsecured Creditor in the Modern Law of Secured Transactions by Raphael, Jesse S
Boston College Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 2 Article 5
4-1-1961
The Status of the Unsecured Creditor in the
Modern Law of Secured Transactions
Jesse S. Raphael
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Secured Transactions Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jesse S. Raphael, The Status of the Unsecured Creditor in the Modern Law of Secured Transactions, 2
B.C.L. Rev. 303 (1961), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol2/iss2/5
THE STATUS OF THE UNSECURED CREDITOR
IN THE MODERN LAW OF SECURED
TRANSACTIONS
JESSE S. RAPHAEL*
The conflict between secured creditors and unsecured creditors,
and their respective advocates, goes back at least to the days of
the Roman Empire,' In Anglo-American law, it is discernible in the
development of the common law and statutory rules delineating the
rights of these claimants and the restrictions imposed on security
devices.
There never seemed to be any legal objection to the concept of
security as such. If, by agreement between a debtor and a creditor,
specific property of the debtor was dedicated to the satisfaction of that
creditor's claim, the fact that the debtor's property, to the extent of
the security, was placed beyond the reach of other creditors of the
debtor for the satisfaction of their claims, was not considered unjust
or unlawful. But if the transfer of property by a debtor, whether by
way of security or not, was made with intent to defraud creditors, the
transfer was void and of no effect. This was the rule of the English
Statute of 13 Elizabeth I. 2
In interpreting the statute, the English courts from time to time
found certain types of acts to be "badges of fraud." The first impor-
tant case in this regard was Twynes' Case' decided in 1601, which
is said to have established the doctrine that "where the mortgagor of
chattels was left in possession with power to sell them for his own
benefit,' the transaction was fraudulent as to the creditors of the
mortgagor "without reference to bona fides of the mortgage debt, or
* Professor of Law, Pace College. B.A. 1913, City College of New York; LL.B.
1916, Columbia University.
[En. NOTE: In 1 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 65 (1959), William A. Schnader, Chair-
man of the Commercial Code Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, discussed six years of satisfactory experience in Pennsylvania
with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, in The Unsecured Creditor—"The
Little Businessman"—and the Uniform Commercial Code. See, The Uniform Com-
mercial Code in Pennsylvania, 1954-1961, Experience—Not Theory, Commercial Code
Committee, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1961).
Professor Raphael states that his ultimate quarrel is not with Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code in its reflection of modern trends in secured financing, but rather with
the trends in financing which preceded the Code and which it reflects.]
1 Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances at Roman Law, 18 Va. L. Rev. 109 (1931).
2 Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances, 1570, 13 Eliz., c, 5.
3 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (K.B. 1601).
4 73 A.L.R. 236, 237 (1931).
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the honesty of the intention of the parties."' The debtor's retention
of possession, with power of disposition, according to the reasoning of
the court, tended to delude those who advanced unsecured credit into
believing that the retained property was still owned by the debtor and
was available for the payment of their claims.
The American courts were not unanimous in holding possession
retained, with power of disposition, as a badge of fraud. The majority
considered it as conclusive proof of fraud; ° a few held that it raised a
rebuttable presumption of fraud' and others held that it was a valid
transaction unless an actual intent to defraud creditors could be shown
from the statements or conduct of the parties.'
The mortgage transaction in which the debtor retains the power to
dispose of the secured chattels after the mortgage concerns primarily
mortgages of the debtor's stock-in-trade, i.e., inventory. The disap-
proval of these transactions was intensified by another rule which
frowned upon mortgage transactions covering after-acquired goods.
Here, the New York courts, adhering to the theory that a mortgage
was a conveyance of title, developed the rule that it was legally impos-
sible to create a mortgage "conveyance" of goods not yet in existence
or not yet owned by the mortgagor.'
The United States Supreme Court in Benedict v. Ratner,' applied
the New York prohibition to the assignment of accounts receivable as
security but developed a new theory for declaring the transactions
void as to creditors."
5 See Annot., 73 A.L.R. 236 (1931).
9 In Clow v. Woods, 5 S. & R. 275 (Pa. 1819), Duncan, J., says at page 286: "In
chattels, possession is the strongest evidence of ownership. That a secret mortgage to
secure a creditor, without any change of possession, the debtor in the daily and constant
occupation of the goods, . . . should be valid, and bind the property against creditors
.. would be a reproach to the law. It ought not, it cannot be so. If it were so, it
would put an end to all credit."
7 Supra note 5, at 250.
8 Id. at 253.
9 Stone, The Equitable Mortgage in New York, 20 Colum. L. Rev. 519 (1920).
10 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
11 Id. at 360. The court said: "Under the law of New York a transfer of property
as security, which reserves to the transferor the right to dispose of the same, or to
apply the proceeds thereof, for his own uses, is, as to creditors, fraudulent in law and
void. This is true whether the right of disposition for the transferor's use be reserved
in the instrument or by agreement in pais oral or written; whether the right of dis-
position reserved be unlimited in time or be expressly terminable by the happening
of an event; whether the transfer cover all the property of the debtor or only a part;
whether the right of disposition extends to all the property transferred or only a part
thereof; and whether the instrument of transfer be recorded or not. . . .
"But it would seem clear that whether the collateral consists of chattels or of accounts,
reservation of dominion inconsistent with the effective disposition of title must render
the transaction void. Ratner asserts that the rule stated above rests upon ostensible
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To synthesize, then, the principles which, since Twyne's Case,
have been developed by the English and American courts, applicable
to the restrictions on secured transactions involving merchandise in-
ventory and accounts receivable, one may say that, in general, the
courts expressly condemned these transactions as "fraudulent" or
"illusory" if (1) they created secret liens, (2) the debtor remained in
possession of the property after hypothecation, (3) the debtor had
permission to dispose of the hypothecated chattels without accounting
to the secured creditor and (4) the security contract purported to
cover after-acquired goods thereby making the security contract a
sort of floating lien or charge on a shifting stock of goods.
It is possible that the courts instinctively sensed that the fore-
going situations constituted injustices to the unsecured creditors be-
cause they failed to provide for a "cushion of free assets" to which'
unsecured creditors could look for the satisfaction of their claims.
The authors of the Uniform Commercial Code agree with this inter-
pretation of the old common law doctrines.'
Due to certain business pressures (later discussed), in the forty-
year period roughly between 1910 and 1950, new security devices
were sanctioned, principally by legislative action. The new rules were
aimed at validating transactions by which a creditor could have a
security interest in chattels despite the power of the debtor to dispose
of the property by sale, and regardless of the fact that the security
items were constantly shifting due to sales and replacements.
The New York Act of 1911, known as the Factors' Lien Act,"
and subsequently adopted in substance by other states, provides that
"a lender may, by agreement with a borrower, obtain a continuing
general lien upon the borrower's merchandise, including after-acquired
merchandise, to secure present and future advances and other obliga-
tions effective against the borrower's creditors."" Such a lender is
generally called "a factor." Publicity is given to the transaction by
requiring the parties to file a "notice" of the agreement in a designated
public office and, in some states, by requiring the posting of another
"notice" in the premises of the borrower. The statutes also usually
ownership, and argues that the doctrine of ostensible ownership is not applicable to book
accounts. . . . But it is not true that the rule stated above and invoked by the receiver
is either based upon or delimited by the doctrine of ostensible ownership. It rests not
upon seeming ownership because of possession retained, but upon a lack of ownership
because of dominion reserved. It does not raise a presumption of fraud. It imputes
fraud conclusively because of the reservation of dominion inconsistent with the effective
disposition of title and creation of a lien."
12 Infra at 308.
13 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law, § 45.
14 Skilton, The Factors' Lien on Merchandise, 1955 Wis. L. Rev. 356, 357.
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provide that accounts receivable arising from the sale of the hypothe-
cated merchandise shall likewise be covered by the security right of
the factor, provided that separate assignments are delivered by bor-
rower to factor of each account as it is created or provided that the
account debtor is notified of the assignment."
Another modern security innovation, the trust receipt transaction,
also has as one of its purposes the creation of a lien on inventory valid
against other creditors regardless of the debtor's power of sale. In
the absence of statute," the trust receipt transaction has had a check-
ered career in the courts."
15 Supra note 12.
15 The Uniform Trust Receipts Act (hereinafter cited as U.T.RA.) has been adopted
in the following jurisdictions: Alabama, Ala. Code tit. 39, §§ 191(4)-191(22) (Supp.
1953); Alaska, Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. ch. 40 (1951); Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 44-821 to 44-839 (1956) ; California, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3012 to 3016.16; Connecticut,
Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§ 40-60 to 40-80 (1958); Delaware, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6,
§§ 1101-1118 (1953); Florida, Fla. Stat. §§ 673,01-673.18 (Supp. 1958); Hawaii, Hawaii
Rev. Laws §§ 206-1 to 206-17 (1955); Idaho, Idaho Code Ann. §§ 64-1001 to 64-1020
(1948); Illinois, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121/, §§ 166-187 (Supp. 1958); Indiana, Ind. Ann.
Stat. §§ 51-601 to 51-621 (1951) ; Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 189, §§ 1-20 (1954) ;
Maryland, Md. Ann. Code art. 95%, §§ 1-20 (1951); Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 225A, §§ 1-21 (Massachusetts By-Laws 1957, ch. 765 adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 106, §§ I-I01 to 9-507, effective October I,
1958 thereby repealing the provisions of the U.T.R.A.); Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws
§§ 555.401-555.419 (Supp. 1956) ; Minnesota, Minn. Stat. §§ 522.01-522.17 (1957) ;
Mississippi, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 5080-01 to 5080-23 (1957); Montana, Mont. Rev. Codes
Ann. H 65-201 to 65-219 (1953); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. If 69-701 to 69-720
(1958); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. H 93.010-93.200 (1957); New Hampshire, N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. H 445.1 to 445.19 (1955) ; New Jersey, N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 46:35-1 to
46:35-21 (1940); New Mexico, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-13-1 to 50-13-19 (1953); New
York, N.Y. Pers, Prop. Law §§ 50 to 58-1; North Dakota, N.D. Rev. Code §§ 41-1801
to 41-1819 (Supp. 1957) ; Oregon, Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 73.010 to 73.200 (1959); Puerto
Rico, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10, §§ 611-633; South Dakota, S.D. Code §§ 39.1801 to
39.1820 (Supp. 1960); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-1001 to 47-1019 (1955); Texas,
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 5499a-51 (Supp. 1960); Utah, Utah Code Ann. §§ 9-2-1 to
9-2-20 (1953); Virginia, Va. Code Ann. ill 6-550 to 6-568 (1950); Washington, Wash.
Rev. Code § 61.20.010-61.20.190 (Supp. 1958); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. §§ 241.31 to 241.50
(1957); Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-296 to 34-314 (1957). See also, Vol. 9C Uni-
form Laws Annotated 220.
17 Durfee, Cases on Security (1951). For example, prior to the adoption of the
U.T.RA., many states held that only triparty trust receipt transactions were valid. The
cntruster had to acquire his title to the secured goods from a source other than the
trustee. Dissatisfaction with this common law rule was expressed in the Commissioner's
Note to the U.T.R.A. "There is also, for instance, the established rule (at common law)
that if the importer (or auto or radio dealer) happens to get title into himself before
the financer acquires his security interest, the unrecorded trust receipt will be void against
the importer's (or dealer's) trustee in bankruptcy. One can put case after case of com-
mon occurrence in auto finance, in which a lawyer must remain in doubt as to whether the
title had passed to the financer directly or had passed through the dealer, with resultant
invalidity of the financer's interest." Vol. 9C, Uniform Laws Annotated 222. See gener-
ally, McGowan, Trust Receipts, The Variations in Their Legal Status (1947); Stiller, In-
ventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, The Maryland Maze, 18 Md. L. Rev. 185-233
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There is much more justification for supporting the financing
creditor's security interest in a trust receipt transaction than in a
factor's lien transaction. The trust receipt covers a specific chattel
which becomes an asset of the borrower-merchant only by reason of
the payment advanced by the secured creditor. The original supplier
is, as a matter of practice, if not as a matter of legal requirement, paid
in full before the lien attaches. Under the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act, as each specific chattel is placed in the hands of the borrower, a
trust receipt in which it is identified is delivered to the secured creditor.
In the absence of the trust receipt, the creditor has no security interest.
In the trust receipt transaction, therefore, the secured creditor, by a
general agreement, acquires security rights over a shifting inventory.
In a factoring transaction, on the other hand, the inventory is
acquired ordinarily by the borrower and comes under the factor's lien
only after such acquisition. Since the borrower may, and most often
does, acquire such inventory from suppliers on open credit, there
arises immediately a conflict of interest between the secured creditor
(factor) and the unsecured creditor (the supplier).
Because of the fundamental differences in the nature of trust
receipt financing from other forms of inventory and accounts receiv-
able financing, the impact of the former on the rights of unsecured
creditors will not be discussed further in this article.
The latest attempt at statutory regulation of secured transactions
generally, and hence those involving inventory and accounts receivable,
is the Uniform Commercial Code."
Article 9 of the Code "sets out a comprehensive scheme for the
regulation of security interests in personal property and fixtures. It
supersedes existing legislation dealing with such security devices as
chattel mortgages, conditional sales, trust receipts, factor's liens and
assignments of accounts receivable. 7"9
The architects of the Code frankly admit that the Code aims to
abolish all the common law prohibitions against liens in after-acquired
property and to make applicable to all secured transactions the , prin-
ciple of the "continuing general lien" stated in Section 45 of the New
(1958),; Rudolph, Judicial Construction of the Trust Receipt and Its Reflection in the
Commercial Code, 19 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 1-20 (1957); Heindl, Trust Receipt Financing
under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 26 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 197-268 (1948); Bogert,
Effect of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 26 (1935).
18 The Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter cited as the UCC) is now on the
statute books of nine states—Pennsylvania (1953), Massachusetts (1957), Kentucky
(1958), Connecticut (1959), New Hampshire (1959), Rhode Island (1960—to become
effective as of January 2, 1962), Arkansas (1961), Wyoming (1961) and New Mexico
(1961).
UCC § 9-101 and Comments.
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York Personal Property Law (Factor's Act). 20 The Code also "vali-
dates a security interest in the debtor's existing and future assets, even
though . . . the debtor has liberty to use or dispose of collateral with-
out being required to account for the proceeds or substitute new
collateral,"2' thus sweeping aside all the common Iaw objections to
these transactions. The Code likewise expressly repudiates the rules
laid down in Benedict v. Ratner.22
In general, the lien under the Code is perfected against creditors
by filing a financing statement giving the names and addresses of
financer and borrower and a statement indicating the types or describ-
ing the items of collateral 23 The required statement is similar to the
one required under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.'
There is general agreement that the Code provisions go as far as
any existing statute or case law to make it easier for the financer who
takes inventory or accounts receivable as his security to maintain and
perfect his security interest as against other creditors. The sponsors of
the Code state their philosophy in Comment 3 to Section 9-204 of the
Code:—
"The widespread nineteenth century prejudice against the
floating charge was based on a feeling, often inarticulate in
the opinions, that a commercial borrower should not be al-
lowed to encumber all his assets present and future, and that
for the protection not only of the borrower but of his other
creditors a cushion of free assets should be preserved. That
inarticulate premise has much to recommend it. This Article
decisively rejects it not 'on the ground that it was wrong in
policy but on the ground that it has not been effective.
(Italics mine.) In the past fifty years there has been a multi-
plication of security devices designed to avoid the policy:
field warehousing, trust receipts, 'factor's lien' acts and so on.
The cushion of free assets has not been preserved. In almost
every state it is now possible for the borrower to give a lien
on everything he has or will have. There have no doubt been
sufficient economic reasons for the change. This Article, in
expressly validating the floating charge, merely recognizes
an existing state of things."
All that has thus far been said indicates that in the past half
" UCC § 9-204, Comment 3.
21 Ibid.
22 UCC 9-205, Comment 1.
23 UCC § 9 -402.
24 U.T.R.A.
	 13(3), (4).
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century, particularly in the past 30 years, the changes in statutory
law have tended to break down the old common law safeguards with
a view towards encouraging the lending of money against the security
of present and future inventory and accounts receivable. The posi-
tion of the secured creditor in this area, vis-à-vis the unsecured credi-
tor, has been strongly entrenched and strengthened. The rights and
interests of unsecured creditors have been pro tanto weakened.
The writer takes as his basic thesis that the law does not fulfill
its fundamental purpose if, as the authors of the Uniform Commercial
Code state in their CoMment, it merely seeks to reflect and encourage
prevailing business practices. If such practices are economically or
morally unjustifiable, then the law does a disservice to the community
in providing a framework in which such practices can continue and
grow.
We should, therefore, be concerned with the following questions:
(1) Are the modern business practices involved in advances against
the collateral of inventory or accounts receivable economically
justifiable? (2) Does the available evidence indicate that these
practices result in a gross injustice to the unsecured creditors of the
borrower who seeks or takes this type of financing?
Commentators (lawyers and economists) in Law Reviews and
other professional journals, who justify these practices, applaud the
new laws for favoring the factors and other financers of inventory
and accounts receivable, and contend that those laws and the prac-
tices they encourage are a great boon to the business enterprise
borrower, to the general community, and even to the unsecured
creditors. Their arguments for this type of financing may be summed
up as follows:
( 1 ) They enable enterprises with insufficient capital to begin
and expand in business;
(2) Business enterprises are able to obtain temporary financing
of seasonal goods bought or made in advance of the seasonal time
of distribution;
(3) Creation and expansion of credit is a good thing even if
some groups are harmed;
(4) Through the new recording acts and available credit in-
formation, a supplier of goods on open credit is fully aware of the
risk he takes;
(5) The funds obtained by the financer will help the unsecured
creditor since the borrower can thus discount his supplier's bills.
As to the first argument—that this type of financing enables
enterprises with insufficient capital to begin and expand in business-
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it is logical to examine the nature of the enterprises thus sought to be
encouraged. The following excerpts from articles written by econo-
mists and others are in point:
"Because small businesses are often under-capitalized, it
becomes necessary, if they borrow at all, to do so on a
secured basis. The 300,000 to 500,000 new enterprises
which come into existence each year are sometimes pioneered
by men who have little or no experience in financing a new
business, and consequently begin their operations under-
capitalized. As these businesses grow, even if they are suc-
cessful, they find themselves constantly in over-extended
positions and often have difficulty in obtaining the credit
they need to survive. Depository banks circumscribed by
law, cannot or will not make loans to them, at least in the
amounts they require."25
As to field warehouse financing, which is one of the currently popular
devices for inventory financing:"
"It is a relatively expensive type of financing and it is most
frequently resorted to by businesses in a weak financial
position. Its growth during the depression was due both to
the fact that businesses, particularly those in a weak finan-
cial position, required a large volume of working capital
financing and to the fact that banks were eagerly seeking
additional outlets for their capital funds." 27
And, again:—
"The growth of receivables financing by commercial
banks . . . was due primarily to the weakened financial
25 Silverman, Factoring: Its Legal Aspects and Economic Justification, 13 Law Sr
Contemp. Prob. 593, 594 (1948).
26 This device did not require statutory modification of common law principles to
validate it. The device is based on the principles of the "pledge," in which the
financer's security rights are based upon his possession of the collateral. Since it is
costly and inconvenient to transport a bulky stock of goods from borrower to financer,
the ritual of change of possession is carried out by setting up on the premises of the bor-
rower an enclosure—a field warehouse—which is rented to an independent warehouse-
man. The goods constituting the collateral are placed in the enclosure under the exclu-
sive control of the warehouseman who issues negotiable warehouse receipts to the
borrower. The latter in turn transfers these receipts to the financer, thus giving the
financer symbolic and constructive possession of the collateral. The borrower is usually
permitted to withdraw goods from the field warehouse by either delivering to the ware-
house other goods of equal value, or by payment of a proportionate part of the loan
to the financer. Thus the financer is enabled to maintain a continuous lien on a shift-
ing stock of goods.
27 Koch, Economic Aspects of Inventory and Receivables Financing, 13 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 566, 570 (1948):
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condition of business, their resultant need for financial
assistance, and the plethora of lending capacity in the bank-
ing system!'"
Apparently, the type of enterprise which is compelled to resort
to inventory and receivables financing is the business which is under-
capitalized and in a weak financial position. Such a business cannot
obtain open money credit from the regular commercial banks,
obviously because it is not a good credit risk. Is it economically
justifiable for such business to exist or even to begin? Is mere busi-
ness activity an economic desideratum for its own sake? Is an
economy sound that is built on such frail reeds?
It is significant to note that at least one statute, now law in many
states, and the provisions of which are incorporated in the United
States Bankruptcy Act, condemns the practice of commencing busi-
ness with insufficient capital.29
 It provides that the transfer of assets
without fair consideration is a fraud on future creditors when the
transferor, by the transfer, leaves himself with insufficient capital to
conduct the business he intends to start.
It is also interesting to note that none of the economist-advocates
of the new financing offer specific statistical proof as to how many of
the enterprises thus financed have profitably continued in business.
The actual case histories set forth later in this article are evidence of
what happens to many of them.
In the case, then, of the business entrepreneur without capital
of his own who accepts financing against his inventory and accounts
receivable, all of the hypothecated property has first to be acquired
by the borrower before the financer's lien is effective. How does the
borrower acquire this property, taking into consideration that he
starts off with insufficient or no capital of his own? The borrower
naturally acquires these chattels on credit, in whole or in substantial
part.
The merchant who obtains goods on credit is, in effect, borrowing
from his supplier, since the supplier of the goods, after delivery, has
a mere money claim against the buyer. In this transaction, ordinarily,
the amount lent represents the entire purchase price of the goods.
The assurance to the supplier that he will be paid' is co-extensive
with the integrity and merchandising ability of the buyer, the amount
of the buyer's business equity (unencumbered capital belonging to
28 Id. at 571.
29 Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act § 5. Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 67, 30 Stat.
550 (1898) as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).
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him) and the increase in his assets created by the delivery of the
goods on credit.
When this merchant takes these unpaid-for goods and hypothe-
cates them, he is using the same property twice for credit purposes.
He is, in effect, "robbing Peter to pay Paul." •
Argument (2 )—that the new financing offers temporary aid for
the production of seasonal goods—is valid only if it is economically
and morally justifiable to permit under-capitalized businesses to
begin operations. If the enterprise is on a firm capital base, it can
obtain temporary funds from the commercial banks on open credit,
and does not need to hypothecate its basic enterprise resources.
Argument (3)—that expansion of credit is economically advanta-
geous even if some groups are harmed—is also to a great extent de-
pendent on whether it is economically justifiable to expand credit by
devices which weaken the capital base on which credit rests for
ultimate support. A merchant who carries on his business almost
entirely with other people's money is apt to be less efficient and
prudent than he would have been had his own property been involved
in the business risks.
Argument (4)—that the procedures for new financing provide
against secret liens and set up safeguards of information—has been
stated in one article, as follows:
"But the horse-and-buggy days have gone, and today
there is available at moderate cost constantly brought up-to-
date information with respect to the complete financial
status of prospective debtors." 3°
However, another equally astute writer says:
"An adequate credit check of any business enterprise
requires investigating records in half-a-dozen different
places. .. . The national and regional credit information
agencies, which do the credit job for business today, do not
and cannot maintain facilities for keeping their credit rat-
ings up to date under present filing systems."'
The fact is, of course that the new filing systems under the
Factor's Acts, and under the Uniform Commercial Code, give less
information than the old systems do. The financer and borrower
under the new practices merely inform the public that they are
3° Gerber & Cohen, Mortgages of Merchandise, 39 Co!um. L. Rev. 1338, 1342 (1938).
31 Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 27, 32 (1951).
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engaged in the financing of a general type of commodity. The supplier
who is contemplating extending unsecured credit has no way of
knowing, without questioning financer and borrower, the total of the
assets being hypothecated, or the total of the moneys advanced
against them. As these vary from day to day, it is hopeless to get a
true picture as of any specific period.
One writer, praising the recording requirements of the Uniform
Commercial Code, says:
"Because financing through the use of accounts receiv-
able or inventory or both cannot be kept secret under the
Code, our prospective unsecured creditor will become such
only if he thinks the particular businessman is a good risk
even though most of his assets are tied up." 32
The foregoing statement takes the naive view that the "prospec-
tive unsecured creditor," with his eyes wide open as to the financial
weakness of his customer, has a free choice to extend or not to
extend credit to his factored customer, and that if he does so, he
knows that he must look solely to the personal integrity and honesty
of the customer for payment of the bill. This is hard to believe.
That so many suppliers continue to sell goods to such customers on
open credit strongly indicates either that these suppliers are ignorant
of the true asset position of the customer, or that the pressures of
competition are such that the supplier must take a credit risk which
is grossly unfair to him or leave the field to his more reckless com-
petitor. It is also evident that to offset the abnormal risks which
suppliers of open credit to factored customers must take, their prices
must be artificially raised to take care of the abnormal credit losses,
thus inflating costs generally.
Argument (5) takes the astonishing position that making it
legally easier for financing of inventory and accounts receivable
actually helps the unsecured creditors. This argument is stated by
one writer, as follows:
"In many situations a supplier who has been waiting for
sixty or ninety days to collect his accounts from an under-
capitalized buyer will welcome the idea that that buyer can
more easily create a security interest in his inventory or
his accounts, and thus obtain the money to discount his
bills within ten days." 33
32 Schnader, The Unsecured Creditor—"The Little Businessman"—and The Uniform
Commercial Code, 1 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 65 (1959).
33 Coogan, Operating under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code without
help or hindrance of the "Floating Lien," 15 Bus. Law. 373, 391 (19594960).
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The foregoing statement brings us squarely to the issue raised in the
present article. Do the new statutes which make possible the financing
of inventory and accounts receivable without legal restriction, operate
favorably or justly in regard to the unsecured creditor?
The fundamental objective of the security transaction is to place
the secured creditor in a favored position when the borrower is un-
able to meet all his obligations, that is, when the borrower is in-
solvent. If the borrower has indeed used his financing to pay or
anticipate payment on his unsecured obligations, the unsecured
merchandise creditors at the time of the borrower's insolvency should
suffer very slight losses. What are the true facts?
The writer has examined the court records of four cases, taken
at random, in which an enterprise receiving financing against inven-
tory and accounts receivable became insolvent. The cases have been
taken from the records of state and federal courts in New York City,
where most of the financers of inventory and accounts receivable
have their principal offices. The situations and results in these cases
can probably be duplicated throughout the United States.
CASE #1"
The Interstate Screw Corporation was engaged in the business
of jobbing nuts, bolts and screws. It made a general assignment for
the benefit of creditors on July 30, 1954."
Prior to the assignment for the benefit of creditors, a financer
had made advances to the Screw Corporation, some secured by a
field warehousing arrangement as to inventory, and some secured by
an assignment of the corporation's accounts receivables.
As of the date of the general assignment for the benefit of credi-
tors the liabilities of the corporation contained the following items:
Due to factor—secured by accounts receivable $19,435.41
Due to factor—secured by inventory 52,257.83
Total due to factor $71,693.24
Due to unsecured creditors (mostly for merchandise)
approximately $59,000.00
Due to Federal government for taxes 10,938.16
In the four months prior to the assignment, the corporation had
34 Interstate Screw Corporation, Assignor, Supreme Court, New York County,
N.Y., File No. 23-333 (1954).
35 All figures mentioned are taken from the auditing report of the certified public
accountant employed by the assignee and from the final report of the assignee.
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purchased approximately $53,000 in merchandise, practically all on
open credit.
The inventory and equipment were sold by the assignee at public
auction for a gross price of $63,167.04, and a net return, after pay-
ment of the expenses of sale, of $57,926.96 resulted. Of this amount,
$51,235.80 was remitted to the factor under the security arrangement,
and $2,000 to another secured creditor.
In the two months prior to the assignment, the factor had received
remittances of $18,353.42 against its advances (including interest and
charges). A further collection of accounts receivable, after the assign-
ment, of approximately $15,000, brought the balance due to the factor
down to about $5,500, most if not all of which constituted interest and
charges on loans.
The free (unencumbered assets) remaining in the hands of the
assignee after liquidation amounted to $4,694.16. The expenses of
administration amounted to $2,358.55. The balance of approximately
$2,300 was paid to the United States in part payment of its priority
tax claims. The 118 unsecured creditors with claims of approximately
$59,000, received nothing at all.
CASE #2 8°
The Allied Trimming Corporation was engaged in the business of
manufacturing and selling trimming supplies.
It made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors on June
9, 1958.
As of the date of the assignment, the assets of the corporation
consisted of inventory and accounts receivable (all pledged to a
financing factor), a small amount of free accounts and cash in bank,
as follows:
Inventory and fixtures (gross realization $3,929.59)
brought net	 $ 3,184.30
Accounts receivable (pledged to factor)	 27,690.18
Cash in bank	 136.87
The liabilities were approximately:
Due to factor for advances, interest and charges,
against accounts receivable	 18,441.14
Alleged balance of loan by factor against inventory 	 2,284.41
Unsecured creditors	 38,841.19
Taxes	 2,105.95
80 Allied Trimming Corp., Assignor, Supreme Court, Kings County, N.Y., File
No. D-4 P 1551 (1958).
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The factor's inventory lien was compromised with the assignee for
the benefit of creditors at $1,000, but the claims of the factor against
accounts receivable were apparently paid in full. Out of the free
assets in the hands of the assignee, there were paid modest sums for
administration expenses and $708.52 to the Federal government on
its tax claim.
The unsecured creditors, with claims totalling approximately
$39,000, received nothing at all.
CASE #3 37
Magna Products Corporation was engaged in the business of
manufacturing and selling bicycle parts and accessories. It filed a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy on October 2, 1957.
The factors had mortgages on machinery and equipment and liens
on inventory and accounts receivable. The receiver and trustee col-
lected approximately $190,000 on the accounts receivable and from
the sale of the physical assets. Of this sum, approximately $152,000
was paid over to the factors against claims, including charges and
interest, of about $200,000. After the payment of expenses of adminis-
tration, including substantial charges for use and occupation of the
bankrupt's premises, the following claimants received nothing at all:
Priority wage claims filed $23,248.31
Priority tax claims filed 48,633.09
Unsecured creditors' claims filed 489,336.29
CASE #438
Enel Manufacturing Co., Inc. was engaged in the business of sell-
ing wrist-watch bands.
An involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against it on
June 30, 1953. The factor had mortgages on its equipment and fix-
tures, and a lien on its inventory and accounts receivable.
According to the report of the accounts for the Trustee in bank-
ruptcy, the condition of the bankrupt as of the date of the bankruptcy
was as follows:
Assets
Machinery and equipment (mortgaged to factor) $36,869.32
Inventory (at auction sale price) 3,278.62
Accounts receivable (assigned to factor) 31,027.44
Total $71,175.38
37 Magne Products Corp., Bankrupt, U.S. Dist. Court, Eastern Dist. N.Y., File
No. 54314 (1957).
38 End Manufacturing Co., Inc., Bankrupt, U.S. Dist. Court, So. Dist. N.Y.
File No. 89483 (1953).
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Liabilities
Due to factor against accounts receivable	 $22,241.22
Due to factor against fixed assets	 20,100.00
Unsecured liabilities, consisting of general creditors and
tax claimants	 66,497.07
There were also certain priority wage claims.
As a result of the liquidation, payment of sums due to the factor,
and expenses of administration, there was enough left to pay only 50%
on priority wage claims. Unsecured creditors, having claims mostly
for merchandise totalling $38,860.56, and tax claimants, having claims
totalling $27,696.51, received nothing at all.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing cases show the actual plight of the unsecured
creditor where borrowers receive financing against inventory and ac-
counts receivable and the borrower eventually becomes bankrupt.
The reason for the condition is summed up in a statement made
by the attorneys for the assignee for the benefit of creditors in the
Interstate Screw Corporation case. Speaking of the assignor, they say:
"All of its accounts receivables had been previously
assigned to [factor] and the funds which came in as a result
of sales had to be transferred to the factor pursuant to the
factoring arrangement leaving the assignor without operating
capital.
"Substantial loans had been made by the factor which
had been secured by field warehouse receipts. Inventory
could not be sold without permission from the factor and the
proceeds of the sales would again have to be turned over to
the factor, leaving the assignor without operating capital.
"Interest rates and charges resulting from field ware-
housing and assignment of accounts were so exorbitant, it
made it impossible to continue operations since no capital
would result from sales, etc.")
It is interesting to compare the above statement of the attorneys
for the assignee for the benefit of creditors with a paragraph appearing
in Mortgages of Merchandise written by Professors Gerber and
Cohen." The authors of that article favor the abolishment of the old
common law restrictions on the validity of mortgages where the mort-
gagor retains possession with power of disposition. They point out
30 Supra note 34.
40 Gerber & Cohen, supra note 30.
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that the old common law courts relaxed the prohibition against such
mortgages provided the mortgage agreement required the mortgagor
to turn over all the proceeds of sale of the mortgaged property to the
mortgagee. In complaining of the impracticality of such a relaxation,
the authors of the article say:
"Certainly the interests of creditors are not furthered
by this arrangement. If Jim (a suppositious debtor or
merchant) is permitted to retain the proceeds in order to
operate the business, buy an automobile and perhaps build
up a bank account, creditors will have a going concern to
look to for the payment of debts as well as possible new
sources of payment in the event of Jim's subsequent failure.
f the Mortgagee takes all the proceeds of the sales out of
the business, the effect is the liquidation or at least the
shrinkage of the business. At the same time the requirement
that the mortgagor turn over all the proceeds to the mort-
gagee renders the arrangement impracticable as a means of
financing business. Most merchants do not have independent
incomes. It is therefore extremely doubtful whether this type
of mortgage is worth serious consideration by attorneys or
businessmen?' (Italics mine.)
Substitute "factor" for "mortgagee" in the above statement and
it coincides with the complaint of the attorneys for the assignee of
Interstate Screw Corporation regarding current factoring practices
under the present statutory law.
In the four insolvency proceedings outlined above, there is strong
evidence that the unsecured creditors furnish the assets from which
the secured financer is enabled to satisfy his claims, while the unsecured
creditors and often even priority wage and government tax creditors
suffer a total loss.
This is an intolerable injustice which calls for reform. Although
it is not the purpose of this article to offer a blueprint for solution of
the problem, it is evident that the matter calls for a thorough legis-
lative investigation, with a view to amending the law so that merchan-
dise suppliers who sell to their customers on open credit are assured
that the customer will retain some measure of free and unencumbered
assets out of which the unsecured creditors' just claims may be
realized.
41 Id. at 1346.
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